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Abstract
This article investigates how market participants adjust their expectations of interest rates at
different maturities in response to a monetary policy and a central bank information shock for the
US economy. The results show that market participants adjust their expectations faster to changes
in interest rates compared to new releases of information by the central bank. This finding could
imply that central bank information shocks are more opaque whereas a change in interest rates
provides a stronger signal to the markets. Moreover, financial market agents respond with an
initial underreaction to both shocks, potentially resembling inattention or overconfidence. Last,
we find that the adjustment of expectations for yields with higher maturities takes considerably
longer than for short-term yields. This finding is especially important for central banks since
in the current low-interest rate environment monetary policy actions mainly consist of policies
aimed at the long-end of the yield curve.
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1 Introduction
How do expectations of market participants react after a monetary policy shock? Recent advance-
ments in the identification of monetary policy shocks stresses the importance of information effects
present when looking at the effects of monetary policy. However, the underlying assumption of
rational expectations may not hold and there is ample evidence against it. Yet, it is still unexplored
how expectations for treasury yields with different maturities adjust in response to a monetary policy
intervention. This paper investigates the possible over- or underreaction of the impact of monetary
policy on expectations along the yield curve and discusses its implications.
Macroeconomic models, both of theoretical and also empirical nature, mostly assume one
and the same expectation formation mechanism, i.e., rational expectations (Muth, 1961). This
assumption, called full information rational expectations (FIRE), is so commonly encountered that it
is frequently not even mentioned in applied work. Alternative belief formations can be characterized
by the market participant either under- or overreacting when absorbing a newly arrived piece of
information. By arguing to utilize survey forecasts to investigate information asymmetries in a
seminal article (Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2012), the same authors developed a few years later
a framework to put FIRE to test (Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2015) finding that the assumption
does not hold. This framework has been criticized in a recent contribution, where Kucinskas
and Peters (2019) provide a coherent, empirical framework to assess the expectation formation
process of market participants by the impulse response function (IRF) of forecast errors in a vector
autoregressive (VAR) model. The forecast errors are easily obtained by calculating the difference
of a realized value for a variable of interest and the expected / forecast value, which can be collected
from survey data of market participants. The IRF of the forecast error is a direct measure of over- or
underreaction and can be used to measure systematic deviations from rational expectations nesting
several approaches in the literature, such as the sticky-information model (Mankiw and Reis, 2002)
or diagnostic expectations (Bordalo et al., 2018).1
In this paper, we use the approach of Kucinskas and Peters (2019) to investigate how financial
markets adjust their beliefs / forecasts for different segments of the yield curve in response to two
monetary policy shocks. More specifically, we look at a conventional monetary policy shock,
which is characterized by a change in interest rates, and an information shock, which reflects the
central bank’s assessment about the economic outlook. In fact, the latter arises due to information
asymmetries between the public and the central bank and has been recently dubbed the ’information
channel’ of monetary policy transmission (Melosi, 2017; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018). Empirical
estimates of monetary policy effects not explicitly controlling for information frictions are likely
to be plagued by a mismeasurement which arises through the endogenous response of the central
bank to changes in the economy. Hence, we do assume that neither the central bank nor market
participants have perfect information. From the perspective of the policymaker, i.e., the central
bank, to see how policy actions get absorbed by the markets is of ample importance. We identify the
monetary policy shocks using high-frequency data before and after monetary policy announcements
of the US Federal Reserve (Fed) following the approach of Jarociński and Karadi (2020). To measure
expectations and the forecast error, we use survey data from Blue Chip Financial Indicators, which
1 In more detail, it nests also models of noisy information, e.g., the rational inattention model studied by Sims (2003)
and Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009) or the imperfect information model in Woodford (2001), misperceived law
of motion, extrapolative expectations, adaptive learning, forecasting under adjustment costs and asymmetric loss
functions.
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is a survey of executives and experts from financial firms. Using the monetary policy and news
surprises together with the survey data on expectations, we estimate a Bayesian proxy VAR, similar
to the one proposed in Caldara and Herbst (2019).
Our main results can be summarized as follows: First, we find that market participants tend
to underreact to both the conventional monetary policy shock and to the central bank information
shock. This finding could imply that financial market players are either inattentive or overconfident
in their forecasts. Second, most of the adjustment takes place within the first five months after the
shock, which provides evidence for significant belief distortions. Put differently, market participants
do not act rationally which would imply an immediate adjustment of their expectations to the new
information. Third, we find evidence that the adjustment takes considerably longer for higher levels
of maturity. This finding is of particular importance since current monetary policy measures are
mostly targeted at the longer end of the yield curve. Last and comparing the two shocks, we find a
tendency of a longer phase of adjustment in response to the central bank information shock. Taken
at face value this implies that a conventional monetary policy shock provides a stronger signal to
the market and in turn leads to a faster adjustment.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Sec. 2 we provide an overview of relevant
literature and Sec. 3 describes the methodological framework to measure biases in expectations.
Sec. 4 presents our econometric approach and Sec. 5 the results. Finally, Sec. 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
This paper fits into the recent stream of literature exploring the transmission of monetary policy under
informational rigidities. Controlling for different information sets dates back to the introduction of
the narrative instrument by Romer and Romer (2004) and is widely discussed in the literature on high-
frequency identification (Kuttner, 2001; Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2002; Gürkaynak et al., 2005). A
recent article by Jarociński and Karadi (2020) studies the empirical effects of the information effect.
Their identification approach rests on the idea to separate monetary policy shocks from information
shocks by the combination of high-frequency market surprises in federal funds futures and asset
prices and the use of sign restrictions. If surprises in federal funds futures display comovement
with stock prices, they take this as indication of an active information channel. Hence, the market
interprets interest rate hikes as the central banks internal positive outlook of the economy. Similarly,
Andrade and Ferroni (2020) disentangle monetary policy surprises from forward guidance shocks
for the Euro area. They also identify an information shock (termed Delphic shock in the context
of forward guidance) pushing up inflation and output expectations. Another study tackling the
information asymmetries constitutes Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2020). The idea of the paper
is to build an instrument free of the central banks’ internal macroeconomic outlook, i.e., project off
the high-frequency surprises the Greenbook forecasts of the Fed. This instrument has shown to be
informationally robust with respect to the information set of the central bank and is thus orthogonal
to both central bank’s projections and to past market surprises. Similar results are found in the
event-study analysis of Cieslak and Schrimpf (2019) or again for the Euro area by Kerssenfischer
(2019). Nevertheless, all of those studies do not look at the adjustment process of expectations of
market participants and hence do not allow for belief distortions.
This brings us to the second stream of literature we connect. The number of studies looking
at belief distortions in macroeconomics and finance is growing fast. A large theoretical literature
has emerged that tries to explain why economic agents make systematic errors embedded in beliefs.
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There are a variety of reasons that the presence of new information is given too much or too little
weight, but there is ample evidence against the hypothesis that information is processed rationally.2
Studies putting the FIRE assumption to test show that it does not hold when tested with survey
expectations, e.g., in the influential article by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) and for a broader
set of variables in Bordalo et al. (2020). While the former article finds evidence for underreaction
in macroeconomic variables, the latter finds more mixed evidence also pointing to overreaction in
expectation about macroeconomic variables. The latter study differs from the former by not looking
at the consensus forecasts, but also utilizing forecasts on the individual level. Closely related to our
study is Wang (2019) finding underreaction for the short-end and overreaction for the long-end of
the yield curve. Furthermore, this paper develops a theoretical model of autocorrelation averaging
along the yield curve. We differ from this study in two important aspects: First, we do not rely on the
framework by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) to measure belief distortions, which implicitly
does not distinguish between biases in how agents form short- and long-run expectation as has been
criticized by Kucinskas and Peters (2019). Second, we look at the impact of monetary policy and
its transmission channel in particular due to its importance for policymakers.
3 Biases in expectation formation
We follow Kucinskas and Peters (2019) to measure biases in how agents form expectation about
some variable  . The bias can be either positive (underreaction) or negative (overreaction). In
particular, underreaction defines the situation where the agent misjudges the impact of a shock to
be smaller than it actually is. In other words, the adjustment of beliefs is too small, which results in
a positive bias. Conversely, if the agent reacts too strongly, we have a negative bias since the belief
adjustments outweighs the realized value, which is then called overreaction.
Using these definitions, Kucinskas and Peters (2019) lay out a framework to empirically estimate
the direction, the size and the duration of a belief adjustment. In what follows, we briefly present
their theoretical model for the case the time series is driven by a single shock, but the extension to
multiple shocks is straightforward.3
Suppose that we observe a macroeconomic time series  and we remove any deterministic
component (e.g., a stochastic or linear trend). Furthermore, we demean the process. Then this





for some coefficients ℓ with 0 = 1 and a martingale difference sequence of shocks  . This
means that the expectation with respect to the past is zero (more formally, E [+1] = 0). In each
period we observe that an agent makes an one step ahead forecast denoted by F [+1]. The forecasts
are generated by the following linear stationary process




2 For a recent survey see also Manski (2018).
3The general case with multiple shocks is found in their paper Section 2.1.2 (Kucinskas and Peters, 2019).
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In this setup, 0 denotes a time-invariant bias, while the coefficients ℓ capture how subjective
expectations react to past shocks. From this representation it should be clear that if ℓ ≠ ℓ, the
subjective reaction to past shocks differs from the reaction of the realized process.
In case there is evidence of a systematic error in expectations, we have to define belief distortions
by taking the difference between the true conditional expectation and the subjective forecast. We
denote this bias at time  as






where ℓ = sgn(ℓ) (ℓ − ℓ), ℓ ≥ 1 correspond to bias coefficients. The expectation process
is unbiased if the subjective and the objective forecast coincide, i.e., F [+1] = E [+1]. Further,
an agent underreacts to a current shock  one period before if |1 | < |1 |, i.e., if the perceived
response is smaller than the true response. Overreaction appears if ℓ is positive. In case the bias
coefficient is zero the expectation formation process is unbiased.
The main contribution of Kucinskas and Peters (2019) is that the bias coefficients can be directly
inferred from the data without knowing the true conditional expectation of the shocks. We denote
the forecast error as the difference between the realized value and the subjective forecast, i.e.,

 =  − F−1 []. We know that  = E−1 [] +  and −1 [] = 0. This implies





which is just the IRF of the forecast errors. Put differently, the bias (i.e., over- or underreaction)
can be inferred by investigating the IRF of the forecast errors. In a multivariate time series framework
the underlying fundamental economic shocks are not yet identified and hence not observed. In order
to transform the model into its structural form, additional assumptions are needed.
4 Econometric framework
In what follows, we describe the data and the empirical strategy. The latter consists of three building
blocks: Monetary policy and central bank information shocks identified via high-frequency data
(Jarociński and Karadi, 2020), survey data to construct forecasts errors and a Bayesian proxy VAR
in the spirit of Gertler and Karadi (2015) and Caldara and Herbst (2019).
4.1 Data
In this section, we shortly introduce the data, focusing on two variables that are key to our analysis,
survey data on forecasts and the high-frequency identified monetary policy shocks. We use monthly
data spanning the period from February 1990 to December 2016. The sample is constrained to the
availability of the high-frequency monetary policy instruments.
More in detail, we use the monthly average of the one-year (TB1Y) and ten-year constant-
maturity treasury yield (TB10Y) as short- and long-term interest rates, respectively. By using a
rate longer than the targeted federal funds rate we also incorporate the impact of forward guidance.
Hence, this rate remains a valid monetary policy instrument during the zero lower bound period
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(Gertler and Karadi, 2015). When taking a closer look at the yield curve, we further include data
on three months (TB3M), six months (TB6M), two years (TB2Y), five years (TB5Y), and thirty
years (TB30Y) yields. As the stock price index, we take a monthly average of the S&P 500 (SP500)
in log levels. Real activity and prices are measured with real GDP (RGDP) and the GDP deflator
(GDPDEF) in log levels.4 To include an overall measurement of financial conditions, we use the
excess bond premium (EBP, Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012; Favara et al., 2016). This has proven to
be useful in adding additional information to small-scale VARs due to the strong forward-looking
component of corporate spreads (Caldara and Herbst, 2019). More information on the construction
of these variables is available in App. A.
For the identification of the monetary policy and central bank information shocks we rely
on high-frequency identification. More specifically, we look at surprises (i.e., price changes)
measured in a half-hour windows starting 10 minutes before and ending 20 minutes after the FOMC
announcement (Gürkaynak et al., 2005) provided in the dataset of Jarociński and Karadi (2020).
This data set consists of asset-price changes around 240 FOMC announcements from 1990 to 2016.
In particular, we proxy interest rate surprises by the change in three-months fed funds futures and
stock price surprises by the change in the S&P 500.
Last, we include data on expectations using the Blue Chip Financial Indicators (BC) data base.
The data were purchased and manually checked for errors before using the data in the analysis.
This survey consists of subjective expectations on various financial indicators5 from executives
of financial firms. More specifically, in the survey, respondents are asked each month to form a
prediction of the average quarter-over-quarter change of various interest rates for the current quarter
and four quarters into the future. To keep the notation clear, we indicate expectations on yields with
a superscript 
, for instance TB1Y
.
4.2 A Bayesian proxy VAR




  −  +  ,  ∼ N (0,), (4.1)
with   denoting the × coefficient matrix of the  th lag and a Gaussian distributed reduced-
form error  with full variance-covariance matrix . For the sake of brevity, deterministics like
the constant or the trend are excluded.
Transforming the model into its structural form yields





  −  +  ,  ∼ N (0, ), (4.2)
which corresponds to assume that 00 =  holds. We follow the work of Gertler and Karadi
(2015) to identify the causal effects of the monetary policy and the central bank information shock.
4We directly use the replication data of Jarociński and Karadi (2020) who interpolate real GDP and the GDP deflator
to monthly frequency following Stock and Watson (2010). This implies to use the Kalman filter to interpolate the
months in between by using a set of monthly variables closely related to economic activity and prices.
5 Basically, the survey includes not only expectations of treasury yields with different maturities, but also expectations
on credit spreads and additional macroeconomic variables. The ones used in this paper can be looked up in App. A.
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Let  denote a set of instruments. To be a valid instrument for the policy shock,  must be
correlated with the policy shock  and orthogonal to all other shocks 
−
 , such that
E[ ,  ] = 
E[ , − ] = 0.
(4.3)
We proceed in two stages: First, we regress the reduced form error  on the instrument  to
isolate the variation in the reduced-form residual. Similar to a two-stage least-squares procedure,
we collect fitted values of ̂ and regress them in the second stage regression on the other reduced
form residuals. By using the variance-covariance matrix , we get to an analytical solution to
identify the elements in the impact matrix 0 enabling us to trace out the structural response to the
shocks under consideration. Derivation and details can be found in App. B. Hence, to identify the
model we use the reduced-form errors of the TB1Y and S&P500 as our policy indicators for the
two instruments.
Our approach is most similar to the one proposed by Gertler and Karadi (2015) and strongly re-
sembles the identification scheme by Jarociński and Karadi (2020) who directly add the instruments
to the VAR. An alternative would be to use local projections (Jordà, 2005), but Plagborg-Møller and
Wolf (2019) provide evidence that under an external instruments approach the two methods yield
similar results. Caldara and Herbst (2019) discuss a unified framework for a Bayesian proxy VAR
in more detail. Basically, any of these approaches can be used since they all yield asymptotically
the same IRFs up to a scaling factor as shown by Plagborg-Møller and Wolf (2019).
For reduced-form estimation we use a standard Bayesian VAR similar to Giannone et al. (2015).
Concerning the prior choices we follow Litterman (1986), but show also that our results are robust
to more sophisticated priors such as the Stochastic Search Variable Selection (SSVS) prior (George
et al., 2008) or the Normal-Gamma (NG) prior (Huber and Feldkircher, 2019).
5 Results
In what follows, we provide results for two different specifications. First, a baseline model that
closely follows Jarociński and Karadi (2020) augmented with expectations on one-year and ten-year
treasury bills. This exercise should provide a first impression of the adjustment of expectations on
the short- and long-end of the curve. Second, we have a closer look at additional segments of the
curve.
5.1 The baseline VAR
The baseline VAR features 12 lags and an intercept as a deterministic term. We report results based
on 10,000 draws where we discard the first 5,000 as burn-ins. After the estimation of the model
we further discard explosive draws leading to around 88% of stable draws. Convergence of the
sampler is achieved and checked with Geweke’s convergence diagnostic. The results are depicted
in Fig. 1. The figure shows responses to the monetary policy shock in the upper panel and the
corresponding responses to a central bank information shock in the lower panel. The figures show
the posterior median along with 68% and 80% credible intervals. To facilitate comparison, both
shocks are scaled to either yield a 0.25% decrease (monetary policy shock) or increase (information
shock) in equity prices (SP500).
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Figure 1: Impulse response functions of the baseline VAR. Black line denotes median response while gray
shaded areas denote the 68% and 80% confidence intervals. Interest rates, spreads and forecast errors are in
basis points(bp), stock price index, real activity index and prices are in percent.
We first look at responses to the monetary policy shock. Here, the ten-year treasury bill rate
increases after a year and stock market prices, real activity, and the GDP deflator all decline.
Moreover, financial conditions, as measured by the excess bond premium, tighten. These results
are broadly in line with findings of Jarociński and Karadi (2020), which ensures overall confidence
in the plausibility of our econometric framework and identification strategy. We now examine
how financial market agents adjust their expectations in response to the interest rate shock. For
that purpose, we look at the responses of the forecast errors (i.e., the bias coefficients introduced
in Sec. 3) in one-year treasury bills (TB1Y-TB1Y
) and ten-year treasury bills (TB10Y-TB10Y
).
Considering the results depicted in Fig. 1, most of the adjustment takes place within the first five
months and takes the form of a significant underreaction to the monetary policy shock. This holds
true for both expectations of short-term and long-term yields. The fact that agents significantly
underreact could be explained either by a certain degree of inattention or by overconfidence in
their own forecasts. Considering the sample of the survey, which consists of executives from
financial companies, inattention seems less likely. The period of underreaction is followed by a
short period of overreaction to make up for their initial underreaction. In general, the adjustment
takes a bit longer for long-term yields compared to short-term yields. Long-term yields are to a
large degree determined by movements in short-rates and expected interest rates. If expectations
on short-term interest rates adjust slowly, expectations on long-term yields naturally take even
longer. Moreover, they depend on further macroeconomic fundamentals such as long-run inflation
expectations (Diebold and Li, 2006) which do not immediately react to news / shocks.
Next, we examine results in response to a central bank information shock. Here, we see a positive
reaction of the stock market, real activity, and an easing of financial conditions. By contrast, long-
term rates increase, which could reflect the uptick in inflation. Looking at the adjustment of
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expectations, after the initial shock market participants significantly underreact – a finding which is
in line with our results on the conventional monetary policy shock. The duration of the adjustment
process, however, is considerably longer and especially so for long-term yield where it takes up
to 20 months until the bias in expectations vanishes. In contrast to the monetary policy shock,
the finding of an immediate underestimation in the context of the central bank information shock
relates to a large body of the literature on investigating the effects of forward guidance. Forward
guidance in its most basic form can be regarded as a means of the central bank releasing news to the
public. Structural models often yield implausibly large effects of forward guidance on output and
inflation, a phenomenon called the forward guidance puzzle. Introducing a level of inattention (i.e.,
underreaction) of market participants is a remedy to the puzzle and renders predictions of dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models more reliable (Christoffel et al., 2020). Our results
provide not only an estimate of inattention but also the time profile of adjustment which could
further help improving DSGE models in the context of forward guidance.
5.2 A closer look at the yield curve
In this section, we extend the baseline model to include yields with different maturities to get a
fuller picture of the reactions along the yield curve. This extended VAR features only 2 lags and
an intercept as deterministic term. Again, we report results based on 10,000 draws where we
discard the first 5,000 as burn-ins and discard explosive draws leaving us with around 73% stable
draws. In particular, we include the 3-months (TB3M), 6-months (TB6M), 1-year (TB1Y), 2-year
(TB2Y), 5-year (TB5Y), 10-year (TB10Y), and 30-year (TB30Y) treasury yields along with its








). For the sake of brevity, we only report the IRFs
of the yields and the respective forecast errors for both shocks. Fig. 2 shows the responses of a
monetary policy tightening, while Fig. 3 shows the responses of a central bank information shock.
Both shocks are scaled in terms of the S&P500, in particular to a 0.25% decrease and increase
respectively.
A conventional monetary policy shock is expected to move the yield curve mostly on the short-
end and to a lesser extent on the long-end. The results depicted in Fig. 2 indeed show a more
front-loaded response with yields up to two years reacting most strongly. The reaction of yields on
the very long-end, in particular the 10-year and 30-year maturity yields, is below 1bp and far less
pronounced as on the short-end.
Looking at the adjustment process of expectations, the following results emerge: First and after
the initial shock, expectations of all yields along the yield curve respond with an underreaction up
to five months, after which expectations revert and overreact. At the short end, market participants
adapt their expectations within ten months after which the bias coefficient is no longer significant.
For the middle and long end of the curve, adjustment takes considerably longer, namely between
fifteen to twenty months. These results corroborate the findings of our baseline model.
Finally, we investigate responses to the central bank information shock, shown in Fig. 3. News
and information shocks are often regarded as a form of forward guidance shock, which should
mainly impact the middle segment of the yield curve.6 Considering peak effects of the responses
for different maturities indeed indicate stronger effects in the 3-months to two-years segment. Effects
6Rogers et al. (2014), indicate that forward guidance does typically not affect yields with larger maturity as five years;
Brand et al. (2010) reports a hump-shaped maturity response pattern of euro area yields to communication. Altavilla
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Figure 2: Impulse response functions of a monetary policy shock in the yield curve VAR. Black line
denotes median response while gray shaded areas denote the 68% and 80% confidence intervals. All units
are in basis points (bp).
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Figure 3: Impulse response functions of a central bank information shock in the yield curve VAR. Black
line denotes median response while gray shaded areas denote the 68% and 80% confidence intervals. All
units are in basis points (bp).
are significantly smaller for the longer end of the curve. Yields at the very long-end of the yield
curve show an even negative reaction after about a year, indicating a compression of the yield curve.
Together with the positive reaction on the stock market index (not shown), this behavior is consistent
with a positive news shock about the economic outlook. The latter is typically accompanied by
a rise in inflation, which could trigger the upward shift in the term structure. When looking at
et al. (2019) using high-frequency identification show that forward guidance affects yields with a maturity over two
years most strongly.
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the adjustment paths of expectations, we find that at the short-end, after the shock hits, market
participants underreact to the news before the bias fades out. This adjustment takes place within
the first 10 months after the shock. The picture is more diverse when considering longer-term
yields. Here, underreaction is followed by overreaction and with about 20 months, expectations
need considerably longer to adjust.
6 Robustness analysis
We perform sensitivity checks of the empirical checks along several dimensions. For this we play
around with the specification, in particular choosing the optimal lag length under different Bayesian
prior setups and using different indicators. Furthermore, we re-estimate the model with stochastic
volatility in the error variances to control for possible heteroscedasticity. More precisely, we rewrite
the VAR in its Cholesky form as shown in Carriero et al. (2019) and implement stochastic volatility
following Kastner and Frühwirth-Schnatter (2014).
As is standard when working with monthly data, we use  = 12 in the baseline model. This
rather long lag length comes with the drawback that the parameter space increases quadratically.
Hence, we moved to use  = 2 for the yield curve VAR due the high-dimensionality of the model.
We opt for two sensitivity checks here. First, we use different variants of Bayesian shrinkage priors
all utilizing the idea to either shrink non-important coefficients to zero or to penalize higher-order
lags additionally. Hence, it comes as no surprise that information criteria as the well-known Schwarz
criterion point to our preferred lag length since non-important coefficients are shrunk towards zero
and do not introduce additional noise. When controlling for heteroscedasticity the results are almost
unchanged and qualitatively similar. Despite that, Clark (2011) points to increases in forecasting
properties of the model which can be confirmed when looking at information criteria, the structural
effects remain close to the original model. To visualize these sensitivity checks, we performed a
small sensitivity exercise. We re-run the model outlined in Sec. 5.2 for  = {1, 2, . . . , 12} lags
and with and without stochastic volatility resulting in a total of 24 models. After the estimation,
identification and calculating the IRFs for each model, we compute the median response of all these
models. This median response is depicted in Fig. 4 with the gray dashed line together with the light-
gray confidence bounds (the median of the 10/90th quantile of all models). For better comparison,
we have also included the results obtained in Sec. 5.2. For both identified shocks, results are rather
stable over all those different specifications. The findings concerning the adjustment process of
expectations discussed before still hold. It rather seems that some responses amplify further, which
is driven by the stochastic volatility specification (not explicitly shown).
Furthermore, we also experimented with different settings of variables. In particular, we have
replaced the interpolated monthly real GDP series with industrial production, a commonly used real
activity indicator when doing analyses on this frequency, and used the consumer price index instead
of the GDP deflator. Again, the structural implications remain the same. We also significantly
reduced model complexity for the model used in Sec. 5.2 by replacing yields by the three Nelson-
Siegel factors that are frequently used to summarize the yield curve (Nelson and Siegel, 1987;
Diebold and Li, 2006): The level factor (0), the slope factor (1) and the curvature factor (2)
along with the respective forecast errors of the three factors (0 − 
0, 1 − 






show for both shocks reaction along the whole yield curve similar to what we have discussed before.
Similarly to our previous findings, the adjustment process for the monetary policy shock takes up
to twenty months for the level factor, while it only takes up to 8 months for the slope factor. When
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(a) Monetary policy shock
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(b) Central bank information shock
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Figure 4: Impulse response functions for sensitivity checks. Lines together with shaded areas denote
median with 80% confidence bounds. Black line together with dark-gray shaded area denotes the model in
Sec. 5.2 while gray dashed line together with light-gray shaded area denotes median of all models with a
different specification. All units are in basis points (bp).
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looking at the information shock, adjustment takes longer for the three factors but there may be
countervailing forces at work.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we investigate how US market participants adjust their expectations of interest rates at
different maturities in response to monetary policy shocks. For that purpose, we rely on the recently
proposed framework of Kucinskas and Peters (2019) who show that market agents can either over- or
underreact to new information such as a change in the monetary policy stance. Using the difference
of realized and expected / forecast values of the US term structure, we show how expectations adjust
to either a conventional monetary policy tightening or a central bank information shock – the latter
which can also be interpreted as a change in forward guidance.
First, our results indicate that US financial market participants significantly underreact to both
conventional monetary policy and central bank information shocks. This underreaction could be
either a sign of inattention or a sign of overconfidence in own forecasts and provides evidence against
the assumption of rational expectations. Regardless of the underlying cause of underreaction, this
implies that monetary policy actions are not fully absorbed in the expectations of market participants.
Measures of central banks are to a large degree, though, precisely aimed at aligning central bank
actions with market expectations. Second, we find that most of the adjustment of financial market
participants takes place within the first five months. This holds particularly true for expectations
regarding the short-end of the yield curve. Third, we find that for both shocks the adjustment takes
significantly longer for higher maturities. More specifically, at the very-long end, the adjustment
process takes up to two years, while on average it takes a year for the shorter end of the curve.
Taken at face value, this implies that policies aimed at the longer end do not immediately affect
expectations and hence market behavior. These policies are the predominant ones in the current
environment of zero interest rates, namely quantitative easing and – to a lesser extent – forward
guidance. Last, comparing differences of expectations adjustment in response to the two shocks, we
find a tendency of a longer adjustment if the shock arrives in the form of the central bank releasing
new information. It seems, market participants have a harder time to adapt expectations in response
to the central bank information shock, which by definition is more opaque and can be interpreted
in different ways by the public. Our results are qualitatively unchanged if we consider a broader
specification of the yield curve and are robust to a range of sensitivity checks.
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A Data
Table A1: Data labels and sources
FRED
RGDP Real Gross Domestic Product
INDPRO Industrial Production
GDPDEF Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator
CPIAUCSL Consumer prices
SP500 S&P500
TB3M 3-Month Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
TB6M 6-Month Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
TB1Y 1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
TB2Y 2-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
TB5Y 5-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
TB10Y 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
TB30Y 30-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
Blue Chip Financial Indicators
TB3M Expectation on 3-Month Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
TB6M Expectation on 6-Month Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
TB1Y Expectation on 1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
TB2Y Expectation on 2-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
TB5Y Expectation on 5-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
TB10Y Expectation on 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
TB30Y Expectation on 30-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
Miscellaneous
EBP Excess bond premium (Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012)
FF4HF Surprises in the 3-month Fed Funds futures (Jarociński and Karadi, 2020)
SP500HF Surprises in the S&P500 (Jarociński and Karadi, 2020)
B Identification based on External Instruments
The identification scheme on external instruments is introduced by Mertens and Ravn (2013) and used by
Gertler and Karadi (2015) to identify monetary policy shocks. Generally, it is similar to a two stage least
squares procedure, where the reduced form residuals of the structural shock are regressed on the instrument
 . The fitted values are then regressed on the other reduced form residuals,
− = ̂

 +  ,  ∼  (0, 
2
). (A.1)
Therefore, we get an estimate for the ratio , which is the structural effect of a unit shock on the other
variables in the system. In order to use this, we have to restore the column of 0 with the structural shock,
which we denote as 0 . We do this by partitioning the matrix of the structural coefficients, such that








where the variable to be instrumented is arbitrarily chosen to be the first variable. Furthermore, 0,11 is a
scalar, ᵀ0,12 and 0,21 are vectors of size  − 1× 1 and 0,22 is a matrix of size  − 1× − 1. Furthermore,








Then 0,11 is identified up to a sign convention and is obtained by the following closed form solution
(0 )






0,12 = (21 − 11)
	−1(21 − 11), (A.5)
with
	 = 11
ᵀ − (21ᵀ + ᵀ21) + 22. (A.6)
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